The logic iGLC is the intuitionistic version of Löb's Logic plus the completeness principle A → A. In this paper, we prove an arithmetical completeness theorems for iGLC for theories equipped with two provability predicates and △ that prove the schemes A → △A and △S → S for S ∈ Σ1. We provide two salient instances of the theorem. In the first, is fast provability and △ is ordinary provability and, in the second, is ordinary provability and △ is slow provability.
Introduction
Around 1930, Kurt Gödel proved his celebrated incompleteness theorems. While these results can be seen as the culmination of one era of logical research, they also cleared the way for several new fields within mathematical logic. An example of such a field is provability logic, a topic that still occupies logicians today. Provability logic takes one of the main ingredients of Gödel's theorems as its starting point. This ingredient is the formalization of the notion 'formally provable in a certain arithmetical theory T ' inside the language of arithmetic itself. Once this step has been taken, one may wonder what a theory T is able to prove about its own notion of provability. This object, i.e. what a theory T can prove about its own notion of provability, is called the provability logic of T . Let us write, as we will below, '⊢ T A' for 'A is formally provable in T ', and ' T A' for the arithmetical formula expressing that A is formally provable in T . Then under some reasonable assumptions, the following turn out to hold:
(ii) ⊢ T T (A → B) → ( T A → T B);
These are known nowadays as the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions. Using another key idea from Gödel's theorems, the Diagonalization Lemma, one can derive from these that ⊢ T T ( T A → A) → T A, a result known as Löb's Theorem. In 1976, Robert Solovay proved that for the theory Peano Arithmetic, the schemes (i)-(iii) and Löb's Theorem completely describe its provability logic [Sol76] .
Provability logics are not monotone in their corresponding theories. That is, if T is a theory extending another theory U , then it is not in general true that the provability logic of T extends the provability logic of U . In light of this, it is all the more surprising that, in the classical case, provability logics are immensely stable. Solovay's proof can be modified to show that any Σ 1 -sound theory interpreting Elementary Arithmetic has the same provability logic as Elementary Arithmetic. These include theories as strong as Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory (with or without the Axiom of Choice).
Elementary Arithmetic is a classical theory, which is why we made the caveat 'in the classical case' above. In the intuitionistic case, the situation is completely different. Solovay's proof simply does not work for intuitionistic theories. This shows itself in the fact that the provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic, the intuitionistic counterpart of Peano Arithmetic, contains principles that the provability logic of Peano Arithmetic does not share. These principles are somewhat exotic, and it is unknown what the provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic exactly is. In fact, as far as we are aware, there is presently only one intuitionistic theory for which a nontrivial provability logic is known, a result due to the first author (see [Vis82] and Remark 4.2.3).
In Solovay's proof, the semantics of (classical) modal logic plays a major role. The larger part of the proof consists of embedding models for modal logic in a certain way into the theory T . These models are equipped with an accessibility relation. Solovay uses the predicate T to represent this relation inside the theory T . One may try to give a Solovay-style proof by replacing the models for classical modal logic by models for intuitionistic modal logic. The difficulty about these models, however, is that they also possess an intuitionistic relation, in addition to the accessibility relation. The main question then becomes how we can deal with these two relations.
The main goal of this paper is to find interesting situations where we can give a Solovay-style embedding of a model for intuitionistic modal logic. We zoom in on models of the provability logic iGLC. This logic is iGL, the intuitionistic version of Löb's Logic, plus the Completeness Principle A → A. This logic is, in a sense, the simplest interesting provability logic. Its models are pleasantly simple and hence good candidates for embeddability.
The Kripke models for iGLC have two accessibility relations. To make the embedding work we use two notions of provability each one corresponding to one of the accessibility relations. As a result we obtain arithmetical completeness results for iGLC in various theories and for various interpretations of .
Our Solovay-style embedding is presented in detail below. The embedding can be used to obtain a variety of results in provability logic. Among these is the determination of the Σ 1 -provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic, an object related to the ordinary provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic. This is not a new result. It was already obtained in 2014 by M. Ardeshir and S. Mojtaba Mojtahedi [AM17] , but the present work arrives at it in a different way. We stress, however, that our proof could not have been devised without the work from the paper [AM17] . First of all, it is of course easier to determine a provability logic if one already knows what it should be. Moreover, even though our proof is different, we do use some key ingredients from the paper [AM17] , most notably the TNNIL-algorithm.
Let us briefly outline the structure of the paper. First of all, in Section 2, we discuss all the necessary prerequisite knowledge, and fix our notation. This section contains no essentially new results, but we do prove some results from the paper [Vis82] under weaker assumptions. For reasons of space, we will not spell out any specific Gödel numberings or give an explicit definition of the predicate T . Therefore, it will be useful to have some prior experience with Gödel's incompleteness theorems and with provability logic (in the classical case) when reading this paper. A reader that is already familiar with (some of) the concepts discussed in Section 2 may want to read (a portion of) this chapter only superficially, and refer back to it if necessary. In Section 3, we present our Solovay-style embedding, and formulate our central completeness theorem. This theorem will be stated in an abstract way that does not yet mention any specific theories or provability predicates. In Section 4, we will present several applications of our completeness theorem, among which the determination of the Σ 1 -provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic.
An earlier version of the current paper was submitted by the second author as a thesis for the MA degree in philosophy at Utrecht University. This thesis was supervised by the first author. We would like to thank Rosalie Iemhoff, Lev Beklemishev and Sven Bosman for commenting on drafts of this thesis and the current paper. We are grateful to Mojtaba Mojtahedi for his comments on the preprint version.
Prerequisites
In this section, we develop some notation and theory that will be used in the later parts of the paper. First, in Section 2.1, we fix some basic notions about arithmetical theories and provability predicates. Then, in Section 2.2, we discuss the T -translation, which will lead to theories that prove their own completeness. In Section 2.3, we turn our attention to two nonstandard notions of provability, called fast and slow provability. Finally, in Section 2.4, we develop some intuitionistic (propositional) modal logic.
Arithmetic and Provability
All the theories we shall consider will be theories for intuitionistic predicate logic with equality. As our proof system, we pick natural deduction with equality. An axiom will be viewed as a special case of an inference rule, namely as an inference rule whose premiss set is empty. For equality, we have the axiom x = x, and an inference rule involving substitution. The language in which our theories will be fomulated will be the language of arithmetic L = {0, S, +, ×}. Here 0 is a constant symbol, S is a unary function symbol and + and × are binary function symbols. For each n ∈ N, we can define the L-term S . . . S0, where the S occurs exactly n times. This term is called the numeral of n, and we denote it just by n. For terms s and t, we define s ≤ t as ∃x(s + x = t) and s < t as ∃x(s + Sx = t). Here x should not occur in s or t, of course. We notice that the language L has a straightforward interpretation in the natural numbers, yielding the standard model N. We introduce two special classes of formulae.
Definition 2.1.1. (i) The set of ∆ 0 -formulae is defined by recursion, as follows:
(a) all atomic L-formulae are ∆ 0 -formulae; (b) the set of ∆ 0 -formulae is closed under conjunction, disjunction and implication; (c) if A is a ∆ 0 -formula, and t is an L-term not containing the variable x, then the formulae ∃x(x < t ∧ A) and ∀x(x < t → A) are also ∆ 0 -formulae. We write A ∈ ∆ 0 if A is a ∆ 0 -formula.
(ii) The set of Σ 1 -formulae consists of all L-formulae of the form ∃xA, where A ∈ ∆ 0 . We
To each L-expression α (which can be a term, a formula or a sequence of formulae), we assign a Gödel number α in some reasonable way. More precisely, we require that elementary syntactic operations concerning L are elementary functions (to be defined below) in terms of their Gödel numbers.
Definition 2.1.2. A theory T will be a pair (Th(T ), Ax T ), where Ax T is a Σ 1 -formula in one free variable, and Th(T ) is precisely the set of L-formulae derivable from the axiom set
In other words, a theory is a set of L-formulae that is closed under derivability in intuitionistic predicate logic with equality, together with a Σ 1 -formula that defines an axiom set for the theory in the standard model. Usually, we will define a theory by giving its axioms, understanding that their is some natural Σ 1 -formulation in L for axiomhood. For a set of L-formulae Γ and an L-formula A, we write Γ ⊢ T A to indicate that A is provable using open assumptions from Γ and the axioms of T . Notice that ⊢ T A just means A ∈ Th(T ). Now we define three theories that will be of great interest to us. 
and, for each L-formula S ∈ Σ 1 , the induction axiom
(ii) The theory HA, called Heyting arithmetic, has all the axioms of iIΣ 1 , together with full induction: for each L-formula A, we have the axiom
(iii) The theory PA, called Peano arithmetic, has all the axioms of HA, together with the Law of the Excluded Middle: A ∨ ¬A, where A is an L-formula. ♦
Even though the axiom set we presented for iIΣ 1 is infinite, the theory iIΣ 1 is actually finitely axiomatizable. This is because the induction scheme for Σ 1 -formulae follows the single induction axiom for the Σ 1 -truth predicate, which is itself a Σ 1 -formula. The finite axiomatizability of iIΣ 1 is verifiable in iIΣ 1 itself. It is also well-known that iIΣ 1 , and hence any theory extending it, is Σ 1 -complete. That is, every Σ 1 -sentence true in the standard model can be proven inside iIΣ 1 .
Even though iIΣ 1 is an intuitionistic theory, we do have the following result, which can be shown using induction on complexity.
We also have the following result, that we shall not prove.
Proposition 2.1.5. Let F : N k → N be a primitive recursive function. Then there exists a Σ 1 -formula A F ( x, y) satisfying:
Moreover, this formula can be chosen in such a way that the definition of F as a primitive recursive function is verifiable in iIΣ 1 .
If A(v) is a formula with one free variable, we will write A(x) for Subst( A(v) , x), which makes sense when working in a theory extending iIΣ 1 . We apply similar conventions for multiple free variables. We will need the following famous result, that we will not prove.
Now suppose we have a theory T . Using the Σ 1 -formula Ax T , we can construct a Σ 1 -formula Bew T (x) that expresses 'x is the Gödel number of some formula A such that ⊢ T A' in a natural way. We can write Bew(x) as ∃y Prf T (y, x) for some ∆ 0 -formula Prf T . We think of Prf(y, x) as expressing the fact that y codes a T -proof of the formula that has x as its Gödel number. For a formula A = A(x 1 , . . . , x n ), we write T A for Bew T ( A(x 1 , . . . ,x n ) ). In particular,
T A has the same free variables as A. Now we can define certain relations between theories.
Definition 2.1.7. Let U and T be theories. We write:
We emphasize that, then we write U = T , we do not mean an equality of the pairs (Th(U ), Ax U ) and (Th(T ), Ax T ), but only an equality of the first coordinate. Since iIΣ 1 is sound, we see that U ≤ T implies that U ⊆ T . We also notice that, if U and T are theories such that
, then U ≤ T clearly holds. However, this requirement is not necessary: it can also be the case that every U -proof can (verifiably in iIΣ 1 ) be transformed into a T -proof without the one axiom set being contained in the other. Before we can develop more theory, we need to restrict our investigation to theories that, verifiably in iIΣ 1 , can perform a minimal amount of arithmetic.
Convention 2.1.8. All the theories T we shall consider, will satisfy iIΣ 1 ≤ T . ♦ Remark 2.1.9. As Definition 2.1.7 and Convention 2.1.8 make clear, iIΣ 1 will serve as our base theory. Most, but not all, of the following goes through for slightly weaker base theories, such as (intuitionistic) Elementary Arithmetic extended with Σ 1 -collection. We have chosen iIΣ 1 because this yields the most simple and uniform exposition of the material below. ♦ Notice that this clearly holds for the three theories from Definition 2.1.3. With this requirement in place, we can state some basic properties of T , that we will not prove.
Proposition 2.1.10. Let T be a theory and let A, B and S be L-formulae. Then we have:
Moreover, (ii ), (iii ), (iv ) and (vi ) are verifiable in iIΣ 1 .
We remark that for (iii)-(vi), we need Convention 2.1.8. In the next section, we will need the following facts.
Proposition 2.1.11. Let U and T be theories.
by formalized Σ 1 -completeness, and now the result follows.
For future use, we state the following definition.
Definition 2.1.12. Let T be a theory and let P (x) be a Σ 1 -formula in one free variable. For an L-sentence A, we write A for P ( A ). We say that P is a provability predicate for T if the following hold for all L-sentences A, B and S:
Observe that the above definition has the following monotonicity property: if T ′ ⊆ T are theories and P is a provability predicate for T , then P is also a provability predicate for T ′ . Using Proposition 2.1.10, we see that Bew T is always a provability predicate for T . In fact, any provability predicate for T has properties similar to those of Bew T , as the following result, whose proof is standard, shows.
Proposition 2.1.13. Let P be provability predicate for a theory T . For L-sentences A, write
Then for all L-sentences A, we have:
The Completeness Principle
In this section, we introduce the T -translation, that will allow us to define theories that prove their own completeness. All results in this section are from the paper On the Completeness Principle [Vis82] , but we have formulated some of them under weaker conditions. Definition 2.2.1. Let T be a theory. We define the T -translation (·) T from the set of L-formulae to itself by recursion. For all L-terms s and t and L-formulae A and B, we set:
Based on the T -translation, we can construct new theories out of existing ones.
Definition 2.2.2. Let U and T be theories. We define the theory U T as the theory whose axioms are those of iIΣ 1 , together with the set {A | ⊢ U A T }. For a theory U , we write U * for U U . ♦
We make some remarks on how Ax U T can be defined. The function (·) T : N → N that satisfies x T = A T if x is the Gödel number of an L-formula A, and x T = 0 otherwise, is primitive recursive. This means that we can represent this function in iIΣ 1 using Proposition 2.1.5. Now we define
, where Form(x) ∈ Σ 1 naturally expresses the fact that x is the Gödel number of an L-formula. We study the relation between provability in U T and provability in U through the following lemmata. Our first lemma is the raison d'être for the T -translation.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of A. At If A is atomic, then A T = A and the claim follows from Proposition 2.1.10(iv) since A is a Σ 1 -formula.
∧ Suppose A = B ∧ C and the claim holds for B and C. Then A T is B T ∧ C T , and we have
∨ Suppose A is B ∨ C and the claim holds for B and C. Then A T is B T ∨ C T , and we have
→ Suppose A is B → C and the claim holds for B and C. Then the formula A T is equal to (B T → C T ) ∧ T (B T → C T ), and we have
∃ Suppose A is ∃xB and the claim holds for B. Then A T is ∃xB T . It is provable in intuitionistic predicate logic that B T → ∃xB T , so we also have
, as desired. ∀ Suppose A is ∀xB and the claim holds for B. Then A T is ∀xB T ∧ T (∀xB T ), and we have
as desired. For the second statement, we should carry out this induction inside iIΣ 1 . One should notice that now we need that clauses (ii)-(iv) from Proposition 2.1.10 are verifiable in iIΣ 1 .
Next we show that, up to equivalence, Σ 1 -formulae are invariant under the T -translation.
Using this observation, we can show that ⊢ i IΣ 1 A ↔ A T for all A ∈ ∆ 0 using a straightforward induction on the complexity of A. Finally, if S ∈ Σ 1 , then write S as ∃xA with A ∈ ∆ 0 . Then S T is ∃xA T , and we see that ⊢ i IΣ 1 ∃xA ↔ ∃xA T , as desired. For the second statement, we formalize the above in iIΣ 1 .
Finally, we collect some technical facts about the interaction between the T -translation and substitution.
Lemma 2.2.5. Let A be a formula, let x be a variable, and let s be a term. Then:
(i ) A and A T have the same free variables;
(ii ) s is free for x in A if and only if s is free for x in A T ;
Moreover, these are all verifiable in iIΣ 1 .
Proof. All three statements can be proven by an easy induction on the complexity of A. For the induction steps for implication and universal quantification in statement (iii), one should observe that, verifiably in iIΣ 1 , we have
Using these lemmata, we can prove the following crucial result.
Theorem 2.2.6. Let U and T be theories such that
Remark 2.2.7. (i) By Proposition 2.1.11(i), the conditions on U and T apply in particular when U ⊆ T . We formulate this theorem (and Corollary 2.2.10 below) in such a strong way in order to obtain Proposition 2.3.8 below.
(ii) We warn the reader that, under these conditions on U and T , we cannot necessarily verify the result 'Γ ⊢ U T A if and only if Γ T ⊢ U A T ' inside iIΣ 1 ; see Corollary 2.2.10 below. ♦ Proof of Theorem 2.2.6. Suppose that Γ T ⊢ U A T . Then there exist n ≥ 0 and
and by our assumption, we also get
For the converse direction, we proceed by induction on the proof tree for Γ ⊢ U T A. Before we start, we notice the following: if ⊢ U B → C for certain L-formulae B and C, then by our assumption,
First, suppose that A is an axiom of U T . That is, we suppose that A is an axiom of iIΣ 1 or that ⊢ U A T . In the latter case, we are done. So suppose that A is an axiom of iIΣ 1 . We need to show that ⊢ U A T . If A is the axiom x = x or a basic axiom of iIΣ 1 , then A ∈ ∆ 0 , so by Lemma 2.2.4, we have 
Furthermore, we know that
and that (∀xS) T is the formula ∀xS T ∧ T (∀xS T ). Define the formulae
Then it follows from (2.1) that
This means that the induction axiom for S T is provable in iIΣ 1 , hence in U :
Now it follows that
T , we can use Lemma 2.2.3 to see that
From (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we may deduce that C is indeed provable in U , as desired.
Now we treat the rules of inference. Since the T -translation commutes with conjunction, disjunction and existential quantification, the induction steps for rules of inference for these operators are trivial. It remains to check the rules for implication and universal quantification, and the substitution rule.
where
Combining our results, we find
as desired.
Since we also know that
∀I Suppose that Γ T ⊢ U B T , where the variable x does not occur anywhere in Γ. We need to show that Γ T ⊢ U (∀xB) T . First of all, we certainly have Γ T ⊢ U ∀xB T , since x does not occur free anywhere in Γ T . By applying the same reasoning as in the →I-case, we find
This completes the induction.
From (the proof of) this theorem, we can deduce a number of results. Our first result says that under the assumption of Theorem 2.2.6, our construction does not build inconsistent theories out of consistent ones. Proof. The first statement follows immediately from Lemma 2.2.4 and Theorem 2.2.6. The second statement now follows since ⊥ ∈ Σ 1 .
Our next corollary tells us that the T -translation respects equivalence over iIΣ 1 .
Corollary 2.2.9. Let T be a theory and let A and B be L-formulae.
By applying Theorem 2.2.6 with U ≡ iIΣ 1 , we find that
The following result is the formalized counterpart of Theorem 2.2.6. Corollary 2.2.10. Let U , V and T be theories such that
Remark 2.2.11. By Proposition 2.1.11(ii), the requirement on U , V and T is satisfied when U ≤ T . ♦ Proof of Corollary 2.2.10. The '←'-direction is immediate as it follows from the definition of U T , and it does not need the requirement on U , V and T . Concretely, we have
From this, the desired result follows. For the '→'-direction, we formalize the proof of the left-to-right direction of Theorem 2.2.6 inside V . We need that the statements of Proposition 2.1.10, Lemma 2.2.3 and Lemma 2.2.5 are verifiable in iIΣ 1 , hence in V . If we restrict the result to the case where Γ is empty, we get
, from which the desired result will follow.
Finally, we discuss the relationship between HA and the T -translation.
Corollary 2.2.12. Let U , V and T be theories.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 2.2.6, we have shown the following: if A is the induction axiom for a certain formula B and U proves the induction axiom for B T , then ⊢ U A T . If HA ⊆ U , then U proves all induction axioms, so U also proves A T for all induction axioms A. We can conclude that HA ⊆ U T . Statement (ii) follows by formalizing this argument in V .
Next, we isolate a special class of L-formulae that behaves well with respect to the Ttranslation.
Definition 2.2.13. The set A is the smallest set of L-formulae such that
(ii) A is closed under conjunction, disjunction, and both existential and universal quantification;
(iii) if S ∈ Σ 1 and A ∈ A, then S → A ∈ A. ♦ Lemma 2.2.14. Let T be a theory and let A ∈ A.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of A. Only clause (iii) in the definition of A is nontrivial. Suppose that A is S → B, where S ∈ Σ 1 , and that we already know the result for B.
At the beginning of this section, we promised to construct theories that prove their own completeness. We now make this precise.
Definition 2.2.15. Let P (x) be a provability predicate for a theory T . Again, if A is an L-sentence, we write A for P ( A ).
(i) The completeness principle CP P is the axiom scheme A → A, where A is an Lsentence.
(ii) The strong Löb principle SLP P is the axiom scheme ( A → A) → A, where A is an L-sentence.
We will also write CP instead of CP P . This is actually a slight abuse of notation, because is merely an abbreviation and CP really depends on P (x). We write CP T for CP T = CP Bew T . Similar conventions holds for SLP. ♦ It turns out that the two schemes introduced above are two guises of the same principle.
Lemma 2.2.16. Let P (x) be a provability predicate for a theory T . Then the CP P and SLP P are interderivable over iIΣ 1 .
Proof. Define as above, and let A be an L-sentence. First, we show that ⊢ i IΣ 1 +CP SLP . By Proposition 2.1.13(iii), we have
Finally, here is the result we promised.
Lemma 2.2.17. For all theories U and T , we have
The second statement follows by taking U ≡ T .
Remark 2.2.18. We remark that the proof of 2.2.17 also goes through if we replace the first line with 'Let A be an L-formula.' We will not need this greater generality. ♦
Fast and Slow Provability
In this section, we introduce two nonstandard notions of provability. The first of these is fast provability, which can be seen as iterated provability. The second is slow provability, a notion of provability that puts a certain size restriction on the axioms that may be used in a proof. For developing the theory of fast provability, the following technique, that is also used in [Hen16] , will prove useful.
Proof. It is provable in intuitionistic predicate logic that ∀xA → A. So from our assumptions, it follows that
Definition 2.3.2. Let T be a theory.
(i) We define IBew T (u, x) as a formula satisfying
as provided by the Diagonalization Lemma.
(ii) For an L-formula A = A(x 1 , . . . , x n ), we write
Remark 2.3.3. As we shall see shortly, Bew f T is a provability predicate for T . This notion of provability is called fast provability and was introduced by Parikh in [Par71] . In this paper, fast provability is introduced in a different way, namely by closing the set of theorems of T under Parikh's rule 'from ⊢ T A, infer ⊢ A', where A is an L-sentence. This yields, verifiably in HA, the same notion of provability we defined here. If T is Σ 1 -sound, then Parikh's rule does not lead to any new theorems, so the notions of ordinary provability and fast provability coincide. However, the use of Parikh's rule can lead to much shorter proofs, which explains the name 'fast provability'. Later in this section, we will show that, if T is consistent, it is never verifiable in iIΣ 1 that fast provability coincides with ordinary provability. ♦
We notice that IBew T is equivalent, over iIΣ 1 , to a Σ 1 -formula. Informally, IBew T (u, x) can be thought of as the formula Bew T (· · · (Bew T (x)) · · · ), where the Bew T occurs u + 1 times, so we can see IBew T as representing 'iterated provability'. Notice that we write 'u + 1' in the superscript of T , to indicate that the T 'occurs' u + 1 times. We prove a number of technical facts about
Lemma 2.3.4. Let T be a theory and let A and B be L-formulae. Then we have:
which completes the proof.
A. Now the claim follows by induction on v inside iIΣ 1 . (iii) We proceed by reflexive induction. First of all, we have
Furthermore, 
Then by (iv) and (vii), we have
so by Löb's Principle, we get ⊢ i IΣ 1 T ⊥. Since iIΣ 1 is Σ 1 -sound, we conclude that ⊢ T ⊥. T A, however, we need to iterate this process v − u times, which means that the bound becomes a lot larger: possibly too large for weaker theories to handle. ♦ Now we prove the analogue of Corollary 2.2.10 for fast provability.
Lemma 2.3.6. Suppose U ≤ T are theories and let A be an L-formula. Then we have
We proceed by reflexive induction. First of all, by Corollary 2.2.10, we have
Furthermore, by Lemma 2.2.4, Corollary 2.2.10 and Lemma 2.3.4(vii), we have
This completes the proof.
Now we turn to slow provability. We will not give as many details as we did for fast provability, but instead we will refer to the paper [HP16] . There are two reasons for this. First of all, developing the theory of slow provability is rather involved, so reasons of space do not permit us to provide all the details. The second reason involves our intended usage of fast and slow provability. In Section 4, we will obtain results about the provability logic of fast provability. In order to understand and appreciate these results, it is important to know what fast provability is, exactly. Slow provability, on the other hand, will only be used as a tool to obtain results that themselves do not mention slow provability. In order to understand these results, it is not necessary to know all the details about slow provability.
In the paper [HP16] , the authors define a certain 'fast-growing' total recursive function F : N → N. There exists a Σ 1 -formula ϕ F (x, y) representing F in HA. This means that the definition of F as a recursive function is verifiable in HA, and we have
The Σ 1 -formula F (x)↓, which we read as 'F (x) is defined', is shorthand for ∃y ϕ F (x, y). We clearly have that ⊢ HA F (n)↓ for all n ∈ N. However, the fast-growing function F is constructed is such a way that F is not provably total. That is, we do not have ⊢ HA F (x) ↓. Now we are ready to define slow provability.
Definition 2.3.7. The theory slow Heyting Arithmetic, denoted sHA, is given by the axiom formula
Intuitively, we demand that the axioms we use must not be 'too large': they must not be so large that they are beyond the domain of F . Since F is in fact total, we see that N |= Ax sHA (x) ↔ Ax HA (x), which means that HA = sHA. We also clearly have that
, so sHA ≤ HA. However, as we shall show shortly, we do not have HA ≤ sHA. So from the viewpoint of HA, the requirement that the axioms must not be too large is a genuine one.
Even though the base theory used in the paper [HP16] is the classical theory PA, many results carry over to the present case. The most important of these is: [HP16] , Corollary 15, taking S n to be the theory axiomatized by the axioms of HA having Gödel number at most n. The second statement follows from Corollary 2.2.10 with U ≡ V ≡ HA and T ≡ sHA.
The converse of this result, which is valid for the classical case, does not carry over to the current setting, because the authors of [HP16] use a model theoretic argument to derive this result. However, we will only need a very weak version of this converse, which we can 'steal' from the classical case. (ii ) We have HA HA ⊥ → sHA ⊥. In particular, HA sHA.
Proof. (i)
We define the analogue of slow provability for PA, e.g. by setting
, it is clear that HA ≤ PA and sHA ≤ sPA. We know from [HP16] , Theorem 4, that ⊢ PA PA sPA S → PA S. So we get
where the final step holds since PA is, verifiably in HA, Σ 1 -conservative over HA. We notice that HA sHA S → HA S is equivalent, over HA, to a Π 2 -sentence, that is, a sentence of the form ∀xR(x), where R ∈ Σ 1 . Since PA is Π 2 -conservative over HA, we also find that ⊢ HA HA sHA S → HA S, as desired.
(ii) Suppose that ⊢ HA HA ⊥ → sHA ⊥. Since ⊥ ∈ Σ 1 , we have ⊢ HA HA HA ⊥ → HA sHA ⊥ → HA ⊥, so by Löb's Theorem, we get ⊢ HA HA ⊥. But then HA is inconsistent, contradiction. For the second statement, we observe that HA ≤ sHA would imply that HA ⊥ → sHA ⊥ is provable in iIΣ 1 , hence also in HA.
Remark 2.3.10. There is an alternative approach to slow provability suggested by Fedor Pakhomov in conversation to Albert Visser. In this approach we can prove the analogue of Proposition 2.3.9(i) without the detour over PA and without the restriction to Σ 1 -sentences. See [Vis18] . ♦
Intuitionistic Modal Logic
In this section, we briefly review intuitionistic modal logic, abbreviated IML, and we define the system of IML that will be relevant to us. The language L of IML has a countable set of propositional constants, the absurdity sign ⊥, the usual binary connectives ∧, ∨ and →, and the unary sentential operator . We shall also use L to denote the set of all L -sentences. As our proof system, we pick a Hilbert-style system that has two inference rules: (ii) A theory for IML will be a set T that satisfies iK ⊆ T ⊆ L and is closed under →E and Nec. If A ∈ L and Γ ⊆ L , we write Γ ⊢ T A if there exists a finite subset Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that Γ 0 → A is in T .
(iii) The theory iGL is the smallest theory for IML that contains iK and all sentences of the form ( A → A) → A, where A ∈ L .
(iv) The theory iGLC is the smallest theory for IML that contains iGL and all sentences of the form A → A, where A ∈ L . ♦ We now proceed to define the semantics of intuitionistic modal logic.
Definition 2.4.2. (i) Consider a triple W, , ⊏ , where W is a nonempty set and and ⊏ are binary relations on W . We say that this triple satisfies the model property if • ⊏ is a subrelation of ⊏. That is, for all w, v, u ∈ W we should have: if w v ⊏ u, then w ⊏ u.
(ii) A frame for IML is a triple W, , ⊏ , where W is a nonempty set and and ⊏ are binary relations on W , such that: W, is a poset and W, , ⊏ satisfies the model property.
(iii) A model for IML is a quadruple W, , ⊏, V , where W, , ⊏ is a frame for IML and V is a relation (called the valuation) between W and the proposition letters from L satisfying: w v and wV p implies vV p, for all w, v ∈ W and proposition letters p.
(iv) Let M = W, , ⊏, V be a model for IML, let w ∈ W and let A ∈ L . We define the forcing relation M, w A by recursion on A, as follows. For all B, C ∈ L , we set: If M is understood, we just write w A instead of M, w A. We write M A if M, w A for all w ∈ W , in which case we say that A is valid on M . Given a frame W, , ⊏ for IML, we say that A ∈ L is valid on this frame iff for all models M = W, , ⊏, V for IML, we have that A is valid on M . ♦ Usually, one writes 'R' for the modal relation we call '⊏' here. Our notation has certain advantages that will become apparent in the next section. We impose the model property on our frames because we want the following result: Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of A. The base case and the induction steps for conjunction, disjunction and implication are trivial. So suppose that A is B and that we have w, v ∈ W such that w v and w B. Consider any u ∈ W such that v ⊏ u. Then w v ⊏ u, so since W, , ⊏ has the model property, we get w ⊏ u. Since w B, it follows that u B. Since u was arbitrary, we can conclude that v B, as desired.
For our purposes, the relevant frame properties are the following.
Definition 2.4.4. Let W, , ⊏ be a frame for IML.
(i) We say that this frame is irreflexive if ⊏ is irreflexive, that is, if ¬(w ⊏ w) for all w ∈ W .
(ii) We say that this frame is transitive if ⊏ is transitive, that is, if ⊏ • ⊏ is a subrelation of ⊏.
(iii) We say that this frame is semi-transitive if ⊏ • ⊏ is a subrelation of ⊏ • .
(iv) We say that this frame is realistic if ⊏ is a subrelation of .
(v) We say that this frame is conversely well-founded if ⊏ is conversely well-founded, that is, if every nonempty subset of W has a maximal element w.r.t. ⊏.
We say that a model for IML has one of the properties mentioned above if the underlying frame has it. ♦
The terminology from (iii) is not standard and was suggested by R. Iemhoff. The idea behind it is as follows. We can view ⊏ as an accessibility relation that is relative to the various worlds, while represents the 'real' accessibility between worlds. If, in a realistic frame, a world w thinks that some world v is accessible, then v is also really accessible from w. We observe that, due to the model property, a realistic frame is automatically transitive. Indeed, suppose that W, , ⊏ is a realistic frame for IML and suppose we have w, v, u ∈ W such that w ⊏ v ⊏ u. Then we also have w v ⊏ u, so w ⊏ u follows, as desired. Now we relate our frame properties to the axioms of iGLC.
Proposition 2.4.5. Let F = W, , ⊏ be a frame for intuitionistic modal logic.
(i ) The sentence ( p → p) → p is valid on F if and only if F is semi-transitive and conversely well-founded.
(
ii ) The sentence p → p is valid on F if and only if F is realistic.
In particular, all theorems of iGLC are valid on all realistic and conversely well-founded frames.
Proof. (i) This result is known from the literature. We refer the reader to the paper [Iem01] , Lemma 8.
(ii) First, suppose that F is realistic. Let V be a valuation on F , and suppose we have w ∈ W such that w p. If v ∈ W is such that w ⊏ v, then also w v, so by preservation of knowledge, we get v p. We conclude that w p, and thus that p → p is valid on F . Conversely, suppose that F is not realistic. Then there exist w, v ∈ K such that w ⊏ v, but also w v. We define a valuation V on F such that xV p if and only if w x.
Then wV p, but since w ⊏ v and ¬(vV p), we also have w p. We conclude that w p → p and thus that p → p is not valid on F . The final statement is easily proven by an induction on iGLC-proofs.
In order to get a completeness theorem, we need the following terminology.
Definition 2.4.6. Let T be a theory for intuitionistic modal logic.
Notice that the converse of item (b) also holds: if A ∈ S, then clearly A ∈ X and S ⊢ T A. We will need the following result.
Lemma 2.4.7 (Extension Lemma). Let T be a theory for intuitionistic modal logic and let X ⊆ L be an adequate set. Suppose we have R ⊆ X and A ∈ L such that R T A. Then there exists an X-saturated set S ⊇ R such that S T A.
Proof. We fix an enumeration B 0 , B 1 , B 2 , . . . of the formulae in X such that every element of X occurs infinitely many times in the enumeration. We define the sequence S 0 ⊆ S 1 ⊆ S 2 ⊆ . . . by recursion. First of all, we set S 0 = R. Now suppose that S n has been defined. If S n T B n , then S n+1 is just S n . If S n ⊢ T B n , then
is not a disjunction; S n ∪ {B n , C} if B n is C ∨ D, and S n ∪ {C} T A; S n ∪ {B n , D} if B n is C ∨ D, and S n ∪ {C} ⊢ T A;
We define S as n∈N S n . Clearly, we have S n ⊆ X for all n ∈ N, so S ⊆ X. Now we use induction on n to prove that S n T A for all n ∈ N. For n = 0, this holds by assumption. Now suppose that S n T A for a certain n ∈ N; we need to show that S n+1 T A. If S n T B n , then this holds trivially. So suppose that S n ⊢ T B n . Then we must have that S n ∪ {B n } T A, so if B n is not a disjunction, then we are also done. So suppose that B n is C ∨ D. If S n ∪ {C} T A, then we also have S n+1 = S n ∪ {B n , C} T A, so we are done.
Finally, suppose that S n ∪ {C} ⊢ T A. Then we cannot have S n ∪ {D} ⊢ T A. Indeed, if we have both S n ∪ {C} ⊢ T A and S n ∪ {D} ⊢ T A, then also S n ∪ {C ∨ D} ⊢ T A, which is not the case. So S n ∪ {D} T A, and it follows that S n+1 = S n ∪ {B n , D} T A, as desired. This completes the induction. It follows that S T A, and in particular, S is consistent. We check that S is X-saturated. Now suppose that C ∈ X and S ⊢ T C. Then there must be an n ∈ N such that S n ⊢ T C. Let m ≥ n be minimal such that B m is C. Then S m ⊢ T B m , so we get B m ∈ S m+1 ⊆ S, that is C ∈ S. Finally, supppse that C ∨ D ∈ S. Then there must be an n ∈ N such that C ∨ D ∈ S n . Let m ≥ n be minimal such that B m is C ∨ D. Then B m ∈ S n ⊆ S m , so we certainly have S m ⊢ T B m . It follows that C ∈ S m+1 ⊆ S or D ∈ S m+1 ⊆ S. This concludes the proof.
Using the Extension Lemma, we can prove a sound-and completeness theorem for iGLC. This result also appears, in a stronger form, as Theorem 4.25 in [AM17] . Proof. It is well-known that any finite irreflexive transitive frame is conversely well-founded. So if ⊢ iGLC A, then A is indeed valid on all finite irreflexive realistic frames, by Proposition 2.4.5. Conversely, suppose that iGLC A. Let X 0 be the set of subsentences of A, and let X 1 = { B | B ∈ X 0 }. Then X := X 0 ∪ X 1 is an adequate set. We let W be the set of all X-saturated sets. Clearly, W is finite, and we have the subset relation ⊆ on W . For w, v ∈ W , we write w ⊏ v if: (i) whenever B ∈ L and B ∈ w, we have B ∈ v;
(ii) there exists a C ∈ L such that C ∈ w and C ∈ v.
For w ∈ W and p a proposition letter, we say that wV p if and only if p ∈ w. We clearly have: if wV p and w ⊆ v, then vV p. It is also not difficult to check that W, ⊆, ⊏ satisfies the model property. Finally, since iGLC A, there exists a w 0 ∈ W such that w 0 A, by the Extension Lemma. In particular, W is nonempty, so M = W, ⊆, ⊏, V is a model for intuitionistic modal logic. We claim that the frame W, ⊆, ⊏ is irreflexive and realistic. Irreflexivity is immediate from the definition. Now suppose we have w, v ∈ W such that w ⊏ v, and B ∈ w. If B ∈ X 0 , then B ∈ X 1 ⊆ X and w ⊢ iGLC B, so B ∈ w. Since w ⊏ v we get B ∈ v. Now suppose that B ∈ X 1 . Then B is C for some C ∈ X 0 . Since w ⊏ v, we get C ∈ v. This means that v ⊢ iGLC B, so B ∈ v. In both cases, we get B ∈ v, so we conclude that w ⊆ v, as desired. Now we show that w B if and only if B ∈ w, for all w ∈ W and B ∈ X. We proceed by induction on the complexity of B.
At For proposition letters, the result holds by the definition of V .
∧ Suppose that B is C ∧ D and that the result holds for C and D. If w ∈ W , then w C ∧ D iff w C and w D, iff C ∈ w and D ∈ w. Now suppose that C ∈ w and D ∈ w. Then w ⊢ iGLC C ∧ D and C ∧ D ∈ X, so C ∧ D ∈ w. Conversely, suppose that C ∧ D ∈ w. Then w ⊢ iGLC C, D and C, D ∈ X, so we get C ∈ w and D ∈ w.
∨ Suppose that B is C ∨ D and that the result holds for C and D. If w ∈ W , then w C ∨ D iff w C or w D, iff C ∈ w or D ∈ w. Suppose that C ∈ w or D ∈ w. Then in both cases, we have w
Conversely, if C ∨ D ∈ w, then C ∈ w or D ∈ w since w is X-saturated.
→ Suppose that B is C → D and that the result holds for C and D. If w ∈ W , then w C → D iff for all v ⊇ w, we have that v C implies v D. And this holds iff for all v ⊇ w, we have that C ∈ v implies D ∈ v. Now suppose that C → D ∈ w and that we have v ⊇ w such that
Since C → D ∈ X, this means that w iGLC C → D, and hence w ∪ {C} iGLC D. Since w ∪ {C} ⊆ X, we can use the Extension Lemma to find a v ∈ W such that w ∪ {C} ⊆ v and v iGLC D. Then w ⊆ v, C ∈ v, and D ∈ v, so it follows that w C → D.
Suppose that B is C and that the result holds for C. If w ∈ W , then w C iff for all v ⊐ w, we have v C. And this holds iff for all v ⊐ w, we have C ∈ v. Now suppose that C ∈ w and that we have v ⊐ w. Then by the definition of ⊏, we get C ∈ v. Conversely, suppose that C ∈ w.
In particular, w ⊢ iGLC ( C → C), which yields w ⊢ iGLC C. However, we also have C ∈ X, so we get C ∈ w, contradiction. So R iGLC C. By the Extension Lemma, there exists a v ∈ W such that R ⊆ v and v iGLC C. We have {D ∈ L | D ∈ w} ⊆ v, C ∈ w and C ∈ v, so w ⊏ v. Furthermore, we have C ∈ v, so w C.
This completes the induction. Since w 0 iGLC A, we have A ∈ w 0 . Since A ∈ X, we can apply the above result to conclude that w 0 A. So A is not valid on the finite irreflexive realistic frame W, ⊆, ⊏ .
An Abstract Arithmetical Completeness Theorem
In this section, we prove a completeness theorem for certain kinds of provability logics. We prove the theorem in a rather abstract form, not yet mentioning any specific provability predicates. In Section 3.1, we introduce the general framework and define the required Solovay function along with the intended realization of the propositional letters of L . Section 3.2 is of a rather technical nature and forms the heart of the proof. Here we show that the realization we defined commutes with the logical operators of L . In Section 3.3, we formulate the completeness theorem and use the preceding material to prove it.
Definition of the Solovay Function
The general setting of this section is given by the following definition.
Definition 3.1.1. Let T be a theory and let P (x) and Q(x) be Σ 1 -formulae in one free variable. If A is an L-sentence, we write A for P ( A ). We also write △A for Q( A ). We say that (P, Q) is a good pair for T if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) P and Q are provability predicates for T ;
♦
We immediately observe that, if these clauses apply and S is a Σ 1 -sentence, then we also have ⊢ T △S → △S → S. We also notice that
Remark 3.1.2. We remark that the definition of a good pair does not occur anywhere in the literature. This definition is extremely artificial and tailor made to obtain the result of this section. ♦
In the remainder of this section, we suppose that a theory T and a good pair (P, Q) for T are given. We also use and △ as defined above.
Let M 0 = W 0 , 0 , ⊏ 0 , V 0 be a finite irreflexive realistic model for IML such that W 0 has a least element w.r.t. 0 . Let r > 0 be the cardinality of W 0 . We assume that W 0 = {1, . . . , r} and that the node r is the least element of W 0 w.r.t. 0 . Now we expand M 0 to a new model M = W, , ⊏, V for IML. Intuitively, we append a copy of 1 + ω op (in the ⊏-order relation) to the node r. Formally, we do this as follows. We take W = N ⊃ W 0 . The relation is defined by: We can prove that M is again a realistic irreflexive model for IML; but of course M is no longer finite. However, M is conversely well-founded, so M still validates all theorems of iGLC. Since 0 and ⊏ 0 are finite relations, we can give ∆ 0 -definitions of these relations inside iIΣ 1 . Now we can formalize the definitions of and ⊏ given above in order to obtain ∆ 0 -definitions of and ⊏ inside iIΣ 1 . Then iIΣ 1 verifies the relevant properties of M : that N, is a poset, that ⊏ is irreflexive, that W, , ⊏ has the model property, and that this frame is realistic. E.g. by verification of the model property we mean that
is defined by a ∆ 0 -formula, we have: if i j, then ⊢ i IΣ 1 i j, and if i j, then ⊢ i IΣ 1 ¬(i j). A similar result holds for ⊏. Moreover, by Proposition 2.1.4, we can safely make case distinctions like x y ∨ ¬(x y) inside iIΣ 1 . Observe that these remarks also apply in T instead of iIΣ 1 .
For an A ∈ L , we define the set A as {i ∈ N | i A}. The model M is constructed in such a way that the following result holds.
Proof. We have to show the following: if i ∈ A for all i > 0, then 0 ∈ A . We proceed by induction on the complexity of A. The atomic case clearly holds, and the steps for ∧ and ∨ are trivial. Now suppose that A is B → C and that the claim holds for B and C. Suppose that i ∈ B → C for all i > 0, and that 0 ∈ B → C . Then we must have 0 ∈ B and 0 ∈ C . By the induction hypothesis, i ∈ C for some i > 0. However, since 0 i, we also have i ∈ B , so i ∈ B → C , contradiction. Finally, suppose that A is B and that the claim holds for B. Suppose that i ∈ B for all i > 0. We should show that 0 ∈ B . By preservation of knowledge, it suffices to show that j ∈ B for all j ≥ r. But for such j, we have j + 1 ∈ B by assumption, and j + 1 ⊏ j, so we indeed have j ∈ B .
We now proceed to define the Solovay function. Our models are equipped with two relations, as opposed to just one in the classical case, and we need to find some way to incorporate this into the Solovay function. We will use two separate provability predicates to take care of the relations and ⊏. This is where our good pair comes in. Since P (x) and Q(x) are Σ 1 -formulae, we can write P (x) as ∃y Prf (y, x) and Q(x) as ∃y Prf △ (y, x), where Prf and Prf △ are ∆ 0 -formulae.
Let ·, · : N 2 → N be a primitive recursive pairing function that can be formulated inside iIΣ 1 using a ∆ 0 -formula. Let p 0 : N → N be the elementary function that gives the projection onto the first coordinate. By replacing Prf (y, x) with ∃z ≤ y (y = x, z ∧ Prf (z, x)), we may assume without loss of generality that
(3.1)
We do the same for Prf △ .
In the sequel, we write x ≺ y for x y ∧ ¬(x = y) and x ⊑ y for x ⊏ y ∨ x = y. We define the function h : N → N by h(0) = 0 and
if neither of these apply.
Here x and y are two (syntactically) distinct variables, so by our assumption (3.1) above, the first two clauses can never apply simultaneously. Using (3.1) again, we also see that m as in the first clause, if it exists, is unique, and similarly for the second clause. Using the Diagonalization Lemma, we can give a Σ 1 -definition of h inside iIΣ 1 . Then we can prove inside iIΣ 1 that h is in fact a function. We also have ⊢ i IΣ 1 x ≤ y → h(x) h(y), which can be shown by induction on y inside iIΣ 1 .
Notice that it is in some sense 'easier' to move along ⊏ than it is to move along . We have
Since Q is a provability predicate for T , we also find that
We also observe that ∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m) is equivalent, over iIΣ 1 , to a Σ 1 -sentence. This means that we also have
for any m ∈ N. We will need this in the sequel. We also need the following observation: if i = 0 is a natural number, then
where U = {j ∈ N | j i} is finite. In other words, if iIΣ 1 knows that x i for some standard i = 0, then iIΣ 1 knows that x is some standard number as well. For ⊑, a similar remark applies.
We close this section with a definition. 
Preservation of the Logical Structure
In this rather technical section, we show that [·] commutes with all the logical operators figuring in L . The proofs in this section will become increasingly difficult. We adopt all the notation introduced in the previous section.
Lemma 3.2.1. We have
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of [·].
Lemma 3.2.2. We have
. Similarly, the result follows if C = N. So suppose that B and C are both finite; then B ∧ C is finite as well. The '→'-statement is immediate in this case. For the other direction, we should show that
Indeed, reason inside iIΣ 1 and suppose we have x and y such that h(x) = i and h(y) = j. Since x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x and x ≤ y → h(x) h(y), we can conclude that i j ∨ j i, as desired. Now, if i and j are incomparable w.r.t. , then ⊢ i IΣ 1 ¬(i j ∨ j i), so by the above we have ⊢ i IΣ 1 ¬(∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)), in which case the result is clear. If i and j are comparable w.r.t. , then assume without loss of generality that i j. Then j ∈ B ∧ C , so
are both equivalent to ⊤, even over iIΣ 1 . Now suppose that B → C is finite. We first treat the ←-direction. Let j 0 , . . . , j s−1 = 0 be the -maximal elements j of N such that j ∈ B → C . Then for all t < s, we have j t ∈ B and j t ∈ C . Using the fact that ≺ is also a conversely well-founded relation, we can show that for all i ∈ N, we have i ∈ B → C if and only if i j t for all t < s. h(y) j t ) ). Now let k t satisfy Prf △ (k t , ∃y ¬(h(y) j t ) ). We distinguish three cases (which is constructively acceptable).
1. Suppose that h(k t ) ≺ j t for some t < s. Then then by the definition of h, we get h(k t + 1) = j t . But j t ∈ B , so [B] holds, so [C] holds, and therefore [B → C] also holds.
2. Suppose that h(k t ) = j t for some t < s. Then [B → C] again follows.
3. Suppose that ¬(h(k t ) j t ) for all t < s. Let k = max t<s k t . Then we also know that ¬(h(k) j t ) for all t < s. Indeed, suppose that h(k) j t for some t. Since k t ≤ k, we get h(k t ) h(k) j t , so, since is (provably) transitive, h(k t ) j t , which we already excluded. So we indeed have ¬(h(k) j t ) for all t < s. But then by (3.3) applied to j 0 , . . . , j s−1 , we see that j∈U h(k) = j, where U = {j ∈ N | j j t for all t < s} is a finite set. We see (outside iIΣ 1 ) that U = B → C , so (inside iIΣ 1 again) we get
We conclude that
The →-direction is even provable in iIΣ 1 . Notice that B ∧ (B → C) ⊆ C , so by Lemma 3.2.2, we have
Before we can show that [·] commutes with , we first need some auxiliary results. 
Proof. Before we start proving the displayed sentence inside T , we need to verify two auxiliary facts inside iIΣ 1 . First of all, we claim that
Reason inside iIΣ 1 and assume the antecedent. If y < x, then h(y) h(x) = i, quod non. So x ≤ y, which means that i = h(x) h(y). But h(y) cannot be equal to i, so i ≺ h(y), as desired. Now we also have:
(3.4)
Secondly, we claim that
Again, reason inside iIΣ 1 and assume the antecedent. Suppose that y < x. Then y ≤ x − 1, so h(y) h(x − 1) ⊏ i. Since our frame (provably) has the model property, we get h(y) ⊏ i, contradiction. So y ≥ x. But then i = h(x) h(y) and ¬(i = h(y)), so i ≺ h(y), as desired. We also find:
Now we start the main part of the proof. Reason inside T , and suppose that we have an x such that h(x) = i. Since h is (provably) a function, we can consider the least x such that h(x) = i. Then x > 0, and h(x − 1) ≺ i. Again, we make a constructively acceptable case distinction. 1. Suppose that ¬(h(x − 1) ⊏ i). Then △(∃y ¬(h(y) i)) (otherwise, we wouldn't have moved up to i). Since ∃x(h(x) = i) is a Σ 1 -sentence, we also get △(∃x(h(x) = i)). Using (3.4) and the properties of △, we can conclude that △∃y (i ≺ h(y)). Since ∃y (i ≺ h(y)) is a Σ 1 -sentence, we also get (∃y (i ≺ h(y)) by (3.2), as desired.
2. Suppose that h(x − 1) ⊏ i. Then, from the fact that we moved up to i, we can deduce that (∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ i)) or △(∃y ¬(h(y) i)). By (3.2), we can conclude that (∃y ¬(h(y) ⊑ i)) in both cases. At this point, we have ∃x(
Since this is a Σ 1 -sentence, we also get (∃xh(x) = i ∧ h(x − 1) ⊏ i)). Using (3.5) and the properties of , we again find ∃y (i ≺ h(y)), as desired.
Lemma 3.2.5. Let i, j be natural numbers such that i ≺ j and ¬(i ⊏ j). Then
Proof. First of all, we notice that we also know that i ≺ j and ¬(i ⊏ j) inside iIΣ 1 . Now reason inside iIΣ 1 , and suppose that ∃x(h(x) = i) and ∃y (h(y) = j). Since h is (provably) a function, we can consider the least y such that h(y) = j. Then y > 0, and h(y − 1) ≺ j.
Consider an x such that h(x) = i. Suppose that y ≤ x. Then j = h(y) ≺ h(x) = i ≺ j, which is a contradiction since is (provably) antisymmetric. So x < y, which also means x ≤ y − 1. Now we get i = h(x) h(y − 1). If h(y − 1) ⊏ j, then i h(y − 1) ⊏ j, so i ⊏ j. But we also have ¬(i ⊏ j), so we must have ¬(h(y − 1) ⊏ j). Now we can use the exact same reasoning as in case 1 in the proof of Lemma 3.2.4 (with j instead of i, and y instead of x) to arrive at △∃z (j ≺ h(z)), as desired. (Observe that we can perform this reasoning inside iIΣ 1 instead of T , since we do not need (3.2) here.)
Now that we have proven these tedious lemmata, we can derive our crucial result.
Proof. If B = N, then B = N as well, and we see that [ B] and [B] are both equivalent to ⊤ over iIΣ 1 . Now suppose that B is finite. We first treat the ←-direction, which can be shown even in iIΣ 1 . Let j 0 , . . . , j s−1 = 0 be the ⊏-maximal elements j of N such that j ∈ B . Notice that j t ∈ B for all t < s. Suppose that we have i ∈ B and t < s such that i ⊑ j t . Since M is realistic, we get i j t , so by preservation of knowledge, j t ∈ B , contradiction. So if i ∈ B , then i ⊑ j t . In particular, we have ⊢ i IΣ 1 [B] → ∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ j t ) for all t < s. Using the transitivity of ⊏ and the fact that ⊏ is a conversely well-founded relation, we can also show: if i ⊑ j t for all t < s, then i ∈ B . Now we reason inside iIΣ 1 and suppose that [B] . Then (∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ j t )) also holds. Let k t satisfy Prf (k t , ∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ j t ) ). We distinguish three cases.
1. Suppose h(k t ) ⊏ j t for some t < s. Then by the definition of h, we have h(k t + 1) = j t , and [ B] follows.
2. Suppose h(k t ) = j t for some t < s. Then [ B] again follows.
3. Suppose that ¬(h(k t ) ⊑ j t ) for all t < s. Let k = max t<s k t . If h(k) = j t for some t < s, then [ B] again follows. Suppose h(k) ⊏ j t for some t < s. Since h(k t ) h(k) ⊏ j t and our frame (provably) has the model property, we get h(k t ) ⊏ j t , which we already excluded. So we have ¬(h(k) ⊑ j t ) for all t < s. But then using the ⊑-analogue of (3.3) for j 0 , . . . , j s−1 , we see that j∈U h(k) = j, where U = {j ∈ N | j ⊑ j t for all t < s} is a finite set. We see (outside iIΣ 1 ) that U = B ⊆ B , where the inclusion holds since M is realistic. So (inside iIΣ 1 again), we get [ B] , as desired. Now we treat the →-direction. Consider an i ∈ B . Then i > 0, since B is finite. So by Lemma 3.2.4, we have
(3.6)
Every nonzero node k of M has a finite ≺-rank, which is the greatest n such that there exists a sequence
We know (inside iIΣ 1 ) that i ≺ h(y) implies that h(y) is a standard number. Moreover, such a standard number must have rank smaller than a, so it is either in B (if i ⊏ h(y)) or in U a (if i ⊏ h(y)). That is, we have
From this, it follows that
So (3.6) together with the properties of implies that
Suppose that j ∈ U b for a certain b ≥ 1. By Lemma 3.2.5, we know that
Furthermore, if j ≺ h(z), then we know (inside HA) that h(z) is some standard number. Moreover, such a standard number must have lower ≺-rank than j, so it is either in B (if
. That is, we have
So using (3.8) and the properties of △, we get
This holds for all j ∈ U b , so
(We changed some bound variables on the right hand side.) Since [B] is equivalent, over iIΣ 1 , to a Σ 1 -sentence, we also have
So we conclude that
Since ∃x(h(x) = i) is equivalent, over iIΣ 1 , to a Σ 1 -sentence, we have
). Now we see:
where the final step holds since [B] ∨ j∈U b−1 ∃y (h(y) = j) is equivalent, over iIΣ 1 , to a Σ 1 -sentence. Now we can apply this repeatedly to (3.7) in order to obtain
where we used that U 0 = ∅. Since this holds for all i ∈ B , we can conclude that
, as desired.
The Completeness Theorem
In this section, we formulate and prove our completeness theorem in its abstract form. First, we define provability logics.
Theorem 3.3.4. Let T be a Σ 1 -sound theory. Suppose we have a good pair (P, Q) for T such that ⊢ T CP P . Then the (Σ 1 -)logic for P is equal to the set of theorems of iGLC.
Proof. As before, let us abbreviate P ( A ) as A, for L-sentences A. Since P (x) is a provability predicate for T , we see that the (Σ 1 -)logic for contains the axioms of iGL and is closed under →E and Nec. Since ⊢ T CP , we see that the (Σ 1 -)logic for also contains all sentences of the form A → A, where A ∈ L . So the (Σ 1 -)logic for contains all theorems of iGLC. Now suppose that we have A ∈ L such that iGLC A. Then by Theorem 2.4.8, there exists a finite, irreflexive, realistic model M 0 = W 0 , 0 , ⊏ 0 , V 0 in which A is not valid. We label the nodes of M 0 as W 0 = {1, . . . , r} in such a way that M 0 , r A. By shrinking W 0 to {i ∈ W 0 | r 0 i} if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that r is the 0 -least element of is (equivalent to) a Σ 1 -sentence and T is Σ 1 -sound, we see that N |= [A]. By Proposition 3.3.3, we also know that N |= h(x) = 0. This implies that 0 ∈ A . However, we also have 0 r and r ∈ A , which yields a contradiction. We conclude that A is not in the (Σ 1 -)logic for , as desired.
Applications of the Completeness Theorem
In the previous section, we proved a completeness theorem in a very abstract form. In this section, we provide several applications of this theorem. In particular, we will determine the fast provability logics of the theories U * , for Σ 1 -sound theories U , and we will determine the fast and ordinary Σ 1 -provability logics of HA. First of all, we lay some further groundwork in Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2, we determine the fast provability logics mentioned above. Finally, in Section 4.4, we determine the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA.
The Sets NNIL and TNNIL
In the sequel, L p is the language of propositional logic, and for A ∈ L p , we write '⊢ IPC A' to indicate that A is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic. We notice that, if σ is a substitution, A ∈ L p and P (x) is Σ 1 -formula, then σ P (A) does not actually depend on P . So we will just write σ(A) instead of σ P (A). We will also drop the brackets in expressions of the form σ(A) and σ T (A).
Like the authors of [AM17] , we introduce the set of NNIL-sentences. ♦ That is, a NNIL-sentence is a propositional sentence in which no implication occurs in the antcedent of another implication. In the paper [Vis02] , we find the following result, that we will not prove here. (i) all proposition letters are in TNNIL, as is ⊥;
(ii) if A, B ∈ TNNIL, then A ∧ B, A ∨ B, A ∈ TNNIL;
(iii) if A, B ∈ TNNIL and A contains no implications outside the scope of a , then also A → B ∈ TNNIL. ♦ We notice that every A ∈ L can, in a unique way, be written as C ( p, B 1 , . . . , B k ), for certain C( p, q 1 , . . . , q k ) ∈ L p and distinct B 1 , . . . , B k ∈ L . It is easy to show that, with this notation, we have A ∈ TNNIL if and only if C ∈ NNIL and B i ∈ TNNIL for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now we define an operation on modal formulae as in [AM17] . This means that A is in the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA if and only if A + is in the Σ 1 -provability logic of HA. By Theorem 4.3.2, the latter holds if and only if ⊢ iGLC A + .
Conclusion
In this paper, our goal was to give a Solovay-style embedding of frames equipped with both an intuitionistic relation and a modal relation ⊏. In order to approach this task, we considered theories that prove their own completeness principle. This project has led to the following results and insights.
(i) We were able to give a Solovay-style embedding of finite, irreflexive, realistic frames for IML, in the presence of the completeness principle and the principle △S → S for S ∈ Σ 1 .
